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Besides the pre-electoral effects captured with ele, they look at the combined pre-and postelectoral effects with a variable pbc that equals 1 in electoral years, -1 in post-electoral years, and 0 otherwise. The variable pbc, which imposes the restriction that the contraction after elections is of the same magnitude as the expansion prior to elections, almost invariably turns out to be more significant in statistical terms than the ele variable. They again find that PBC are pervasive, and that cycles are stronger in developing countries: pbc has a coefficient of -1.0 in developing countries, and -0.4 in developed countries. They explain the differences in terms of a variable sum, a weighted average of two indicators. First, the variable rents, an average of the five ICRG indicators mentioned above. The rationale is that low rents (i.e., a higher value of rents) indicate smaller ince ntives to remain in power. Second, the variable informed voters, the product of number o f radios per capita and a dummy that measures the freedom o f broadcasting. The rationale is that a greater pro po rtio n of informed voters can reduce the problems of asymmetric information that allow cycles to take place. They find that the composite variable sum explains the differences between developing and developed cycles in regard to ele (however, they overlook to report the results with pbc).
B. Persson and Tabellini
Persson and Tabellini Persson and Tabellini also analyze the effect of electoral rules and forms of government on PBC. As to electoral rules, they find a statistically significant difference in the case of spending before elections, which tends to fall in majoritarian countries, and to rise in proportional countries (though these effects are not statistically significant in themselves, the difference is). As to the form o f government, the differences are more prominent. In presidential countries, the post-electoral effects of a fall in expenditure, and a rise of taxes and surplus, are stronger than in parliamentary countries, and the differences tend to be statistically significant.
C. Brender and Drazen
Brender 
V. Empirical Evidence
We now turn to the evidence on aggregate PBC using the budget surplus. We study the influence of effective checks and balances, and discretional executive power o n PBC in developed and developing countries. We then control for the influence of voter experie nce, form o f government and electoral rules on discretional PBC. Finally, to make sure the impact of executive discretion on electoral cycles is not driven by a larger deg re e of uninformed and inexperienced voters, we check the subset of developed countries that are established democracies.
A. OECD and non-OECD countries
Our aim is to explore the Schuknecht [1996] Table I if the restriction that the coefficient estimate of ele is equal to the coefficient estimate of minus ele(+1) is not rejected by the data. <please see Table I> Column (1) of Table I Since the data on rule of law is only available since 1982, for co mpariso n we defined a dummy variable lod that takes value 1 if lo is larger than 4 in all years that are reported for a given country, and 0 otherwise. This second treatment implies treating rule of law as a fixed characteristic, so each country has either lo w or hig h rule of law. This has the advantage of extending the available data, but the disadvantage of losing the variation over time of rule of law.
In the alternative measure pbc_p3_lod, pbc is multiplied by p3 and lod. As column (4) shows for the complete sample over the whole period, this alternative measure of effective checks and balances, which affects PBC significantly, also allows to isolate a discretional component. <please see Table III> The estimates of the effect of discretional PBC in column (1) of Table III Table IV> Column (1) of Table IV differs from co lumn (1) of Table III <please see Tables V and VI> The discretional PBC cycle is related to a tendency of expenditure to go up, and revenues to go down, in election years (a pattern that is reversed after elections). These effects are not always statistically significant by themselves in the FE estimates. However, it is clear that their co mbined effect leads to a significant electoral cycle in the budget in Table IV 
D. Democracies All, Rich and Established, Poor and Young
Finally, we present a specification for al l democracies amended to take into account that discretion reduces persistence in new democracies more that in o ld democracies (cf. footnote 9).
We also present the estimates for the two most typical groups: OECD countries that are established democracies (19 out of 23 OECD countries fall into that category) and non-OECD countries that are new democracies (32 out of 44 non-OECD countries).
<please see Table VIII> The FE estimate in column (1) of Table VIII We have an imperfect measure of legislative checks and balances, and we do not control for differences in the budget process across countries. This might point to a promising path using more exact measures of veto players and budget institutions. Notes: t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% l e v e l , ** significant at the 5% l e v e l , *** significant at the 1% l e v e l . To control for ti me effects, dummies are included for e ach five-year peri od from 1960-64 to 1995-99, while the years 2000-01 are the base level. These coefficients are not reported. Notes: for fi x e d effects estimates, t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% l e v e l , ** significant at the 5% l e v e l , *** significant at the 1% l e v e l . To control for ti me effects, dummies are included for each five-year peri od from 1980-84 to 1995-99, while the years 2000-01 are the base level. These coefficients are not reported. For GMM estimates, z statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% l e v e l , ** significant at the 5% l e v e l , *** significant at the 1% l e v e l . The instruments used in GMM regressions are two lags of the dependent variable and one lag of covariates. Reported coe fficients corres pond to the lagged first difference of the dependant variable (second lag not reported) and the first difference of covariates (lagged differences not reported). All instruments are treated as strictly exogenous. Notes: for fi x e d effects estimates, t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% l e v e l , ** significant at the 5% l e v e l , *** significant at the 1% Notes: for fi x e d effects estimates, t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% l e v e l , ** significant at the 5% l e v e l , *** significant at the 1% Notes: for fi x e d effects estimates, t statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% l e v e l , ** significant at the 5% l e v e l , *** significant at the 1% l e v e l . To control for ti me effects, dummies are included for each five-year peri od from 1980-84 to 1995-99, while the years 2000-01 are the base level. These coefficients are not reported. For GMM estimates, z statistics in parentheses; * significant at the 10% l e v e l , ** significant at the 5% l e v e l , *** significant at the 1% l e v e l . The instruments used in GMM regressions are two lags of the dependent variable and one lag of covariates. Reported coe fficients corres pond to the lagged first difference of the dependant variable (second lag not reported) and the first difference of covariates (lagged differences not reported). All instruments are treated as strictly exogenous. 
Our results complement those of Alt and Lassen

